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THE MENTAL HEALTH LAND
TRUST LITIGATION:
STATE V WEISS AND ITS AFTERMATH*
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the past decade in Alaska, the courts and the legislature
have served as the battleground for a dispute between mental health
patients and the state. This battle involves a considerable portion of the
state's land and resources. The dispute arises from the Alaska Mental
Health Enabling Act ("AMH-IEA") of 1956,1 in which Congress granted the
Territory of Alaska one million acres of land to be held in trust to fund
Alaska's mental health program. However, in 1978, the Alaska legislature
reclassified the lands comprising the mental health trust as general grant
lands, to be administered together with other state land holdings.2 A group
of mental health patients brought a class action suit against the state for
dissolving the land trust, and in State v. Weiss,3 the Alaska Supreme Court
found in favor of these plaintiffs.
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In Weiss, the court ordered that the mental health land trust be
reconstituted and remanded the case for other necessary findings.4 Since
the supreme court's 1985 opinion, the legislature has passed four separate
acts in attempting to effect a compromise consistent with the Weiss
holding. The parties to the Weiss case have reduced only the most recent
of these acts to a proposed settlement agreement The superior court has
not yet ruled on the legal issues raised by the agreement or submitted it to
the plaintiff class for approval! Consequently, the court has not yet
entered a final order dismissing the suit and the state remains enjoined
from taking action that affects title to the trust lands.
This note will clarify the present status of the litigation by analyzing
the history of the controversy and the legal issues contained therein. It also
aims to identify the parties to the conflict and their respective interests.
Finally, it addresses several issues not yet faced by the Alaska Supreme
Court, issues that must be settled before the dispute can be successfully
resolved.
Part H of this note provides a brief history of the mental health land
trust prior to the Weiss decision. It discusses the objectives of the
AMHEA, as well as the state's role in managing the trust lands. Part Il
analyzes the Weiss decision itself, specifically addressing: (1) the general
law regarding breach of fiduciary duty to a public trust, (2) the invalidity
of the legislature's actions, (3) the court's remedy, and (4) a footnote in the
Weiss opinion in which the court refused to address the rights of bona fide
purchasers and conveyancees of trust lands. Part IV addresses the
legislature's subsequent acts, focusing on chapter 66 of the 1991 Alaska
Session Laws, which serves as the current framework for a potential
settlement. ]?art V details the key decisions by the superior court in the
Weiss case following its remand by the supreme court. The section also
discusses the land valuation issues that the courts are likely to face.
Finally, Part VI attempts to reconcile the competing interests and
emphasizes the need for a timely settlement
4. Id. at 684.
5. Rule 23(e) of the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "A class action
shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice
of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class
in such manner as the court directs." ALAsKA R. CIv. P. 23(e).
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II. PRB-WEISS HISTORY OF THE MENTAL HEALTH LAND TRUST
A. The Alaska Mental Health Enabling Act
According to a senate report,6 two factors prompted the enactment of
the AMEA legislation. Frst, an outdated and inhumane federal statute7
governed the commitment of the mentally ill in Alaska, even though both
the people of Alaska and the United States Congress believed that a mental
health program was generally a matter of local concern." Second,
Congress desired to "divest the Federal government of its fiscal and
functional responsibility for hospitalization and care of the mentally ill in
Alaska," thereby eliminating the inefficiencies in the system under which
the mentally ill were treated.
Under the federal statute, the Territory of Alaska committed mentally
ill persons found to be "insane person[s] at large" in a jury trial.10 Those
who were adjudicated insane under this procedure, which resembled a
criminal trial," were turned over to a United States Marshal. 12 Since
there were no facilities at the time for care of the mentally ill in Alaska, the
marshal transported the patients to Portland, Oregon for hospitalization.
Responsibility for the process was vested in the United States Secretary of
the Interior in Washington, D.C., and the federal government bore all of the
costs. 3 Since the territorial legislature's hands were tied by the Organic
Act of Alaska, 4 which precluded the territorial legislature from changing
the laws regarding commitment of the insane, congressional action was
necessary to alter this unacceptable treatment of Alaska's mentally ill.
The AMHEA accomplished two broad objectives. First, it gave the
Territory of Alaska authority in the field of mental health that was
comparable to that of other states and territories in the United States.
Under the AMHEA, the Territory of Alaska assumed full responsibility for
enacting procedures for commitment, hospitalization and care of its
6. S. REP. No. 2053,84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.AN.
3637.
7. Act of Jan. 27, 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-26, 33 Stat. 616, 619.
8. See S. REP. No. 2053, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956), reprinted in 1956
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3637, 3639.
9. Id., 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3638.
10. Act of Jan. 27, 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-26, 33 Stat. 616, 619.
11. S. REP. No. 2053,84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3637, 3638.
12. Act of Jan. 27, 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-26, 33 Stat. 616, 620.
13. S. REP. No. 2053,84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3637, 3638.
14. Pub. L No. 62-334, 37 Stat. 512 (1912).
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mentally ill.' Second, the AMHEA authorized grants-in-aid to enable
Alaska to meet the financial burden of establishing and administering a
mental health program. Under the Act, the territory would gradually
assume complete fiscal responsibility for the program, subject to the three
grants-in-aid contained in the AMHEA. The first grant awarded 6.5
million dollars for the construction of mental health facilities in Alaska.16
The second grant authorized appropriations for a total of six million dollars
over a ten-year period to assist the territory in developing its program.'
The third grant consisted of one million acres of the "vacant,
unappropriaed, and unreserved" public lands of Alaska (the "land grant"),
to be selected by the territory within a ten-year period. 8 The AMHEA
provided:
All lands granted ...under this section, together with the income
therefrom and the proceeds from any disposition thereof, shall be
administered by the Territory of Alaska as apublic trst and such proceeds
and income shall first be applied to meet the necessary expenses of the
mental health program of Alaska. 9
At the time of the Act, the territory consisted of 375 million total
acres.20 Thus, even after granting the territory one million of those acres,
the federal government owned well over ninety-nine percent of the total
acreage in the territory.' The land grant seemed to be a logical method
of helping Alaska fund its mental health program.
The state of Alaska acquired the territorial rights and duties under the
land grant through section 6(k) of the Alaska Statehood Act That Act
provided that "[girants previously made to the Territory of Alaska are
hereby confirmed and transferred to the State of Alaska upon its
admission."' Furthermore, the Alaska Constitution directs that "[a]ll
provisions of the act admitting Alaska to the Union which reserve rights or
powers to the United States, as well as those prescribing the terms or
conditions of the grants of lands or other property, are consented to fully
by the State and its people." 4  Thus, the Alaska Constitution also
recognizes the state's duties under the AMHEA land grant.
15. Alaska Mental Health Enabling Act, Pub. L No. 84-830,70 Stat. 709 (1956).
16. Id. § 372(a).
17. Id. § 371(a).
18. Id, § 202(a).
19. Id § 202(e) (emphasis added).
20. S. REP..No. 2053,84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3637, 3640.
21. Id.
22. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339, 343 (1958).
23. Id. at § 6(k).
24. ALASKa CONST. art. XII, § 13 (emphasis added).
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B. The 1978 Redesignation Act
In 1978, Alaska redesignated the mental health trust lands as general
grant landsZ It is unclear whether the redesignation was simply a
statutory recognition of the way the state had been treating the trust lands
or a significant deviation from such treatment. A report of the Interim
Mental Health Trust Commission ("Commission") 6 summarized the
state's administration of the land trust created by the AM-EA:
[Aifter selecting the most promising income producing potential lands
available at the time, the State never actively managed these lands as a
trust. There was no effort to protect the corpus from dissipation or to
generate maximum income in the interest of the primary beneficiaries. To
the contrary and from the beginning, lands were conveyed from the trust
at, frequently, less than fair market value and for purposes not allowed in
the 1956 [AMHEA] legislation.
If this description was indeed accurate, and the state had already conveyed
trust lands at below market value for non-trust-related purposes, there
would have been no need for the state to take the 1978 legislative
action?'
The redesignation Act itself gave no reason for the dissolution of the
trust29 Whatever the rationale underlying the redesignation, the Act
established a Mental Health Fund, which was to receive 1.5 percent of the
total receipts derived from the management of state lands during each fiscal
year? The income from this fund could be used only to support the
state's mental health program. However, the very next Act of the same
legislature amended the funding provision to make the transfer of the
income from state lands subject to legislative appropriation.3' This
effectively put the funding of the state's mental health program at the
discretion of the legislature. These provisions, combined with the
25. 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 181, § 3.
26. The state legislature established the Commission in 1986 in response to the
Weiss decision. 1986 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 132, § 1. See infra note 89 and
accompanying text. It is noteworthy that the mental health plaintiffs in Weiss
selected two of the three members of the Commission.
27. Interim Mental Health Trust Commission Final Report, at 1 (December 20,
1989) (on file with Alaska Law Review) [hereinafter IMHTC Report].
28. Telephone interview with G. Thomas Koester, Special Assistant Attorney
General of Alaska (February 25, 1992).
29. But see 1987 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 48, § 1(a)(6). This Act attributed the
state's actions to the "highly desirable location and character of much of the land
selected by the state under the JAMHEA]." Id. Much of the land was "in and
around major population centers or "suitable for parks and game refuges." Id. The
state wanted the ability to satisfy municipal entitlements and make placements in
parks and game refuges without compensating the trust. Id.
30. 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 181 § 4.
31. 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 182 § 4.
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legislature's subsequent failure to appropriate the requisite 1.5 percent of
revenues, violated Congress' intent to create the land trust as part of the
AMHEA.
IlI. T1E WEISS DECISION
In 1982, Alaskans receiving mental health services brought a class
action suit against the state, arguing that the 1978 legislation should be
invalidated because it breached the trust established by Congress under the
AMHEA. The superior court agreed that the state breached its duties as
trustee, but held that the legislation could not be invalidated under current
Alaska case law.32 Both parties appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court.
A. Breach of Trust
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's holding that
the State's redesignation of the trust lands was a breach of the trust.33 In
response, the State argued that its provision of sufficient mental health
programs fulfilled the state's obligations under the AMHEA. To support
its argument, the State cited section 202(e) of the AM-EA, which provided
that "proceeds and income shall first be applied to meet the necessary
expenses of the mental health program of Alaska."' The State reasoned
that this provision indicated "that Congress did not wish to limit the use of
grant lands exclusively to mental health programs," '35 but rather intended
the land grant to serve as a guaranteed revenue base.
The court disagreed with this argument, noting that this language only
demonstrated Congress' concern that the land might have a value in excess
of the necessary mental health care expenditures. 6 Although the case
record failed to indicate whether the value of the land did exceed
expenditures,' the court concluded that it was "irrefutable that Congress
intended to create a trust, to be based on a corpus of one million acres of
32. Weiss v. State, Case No. 4FA-82-2208 Civil, Memorandum Decision and
Order, Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Fourth Judicial District, June 14,1983.
33. State v. Weiss, 706 P.2d 681, 683 (Alaska 1985).
34. Alaska Mental Health Enabling Act, Pub. L No. 84-830, § 202(e), 70 Stat.
709, 712 (1956) (emphasis added).
35. Weiss, "706 P.2d at 683.
36. Id. at 683 n.1.
37. Id. at 683 n.1. The record indicated that the state spent over $222,000,000 on
mental health care between 1959 and 1982. I. at 682. The record did not provide
the corresponding amount of the revenues from the trust lands during that period.
Id However, the record did indicate that as of 1973 the state's total expenditures to
date amounted to $66,726,176, while the revenues from mental health trust lands
totalled $19,555,582. 1d.
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federal land."3 The court further found that the state had terminated the
trust when it removed the land which composed the corpus of the must
3 9
Once the court determined that the state was acting as a trustee, the
conclusion followed that the state could not unilaterally terminate the trust
without specific authority to do so.o
To support its conclusion that the AMHEA created a public trust
governed by general trust law principles, the court cited both Lassen v.
Arizona41 and State v. University of Alaska.'2 Lassen involved a grant
of lands to be held in trust from the United States to Arizona. The trust
was designed to benefit designated public activities, mainly those with
educational purposes.43 The United States Supreme Court noted that the
enabling act in question "unequivocally demand[ed] ... that the trust
receive the full value of any lands transferred from it,"" and that
Congress intended "the grants [to] provide the most substantial support
possible to the beneficiaries and that only those beneficiaries profit from
the trust."' 5  In University of Alaska, the Alaska Supreme Court
interpreted Lassen as clarifying that "private trust law principles are to
apply to federal land granted to the state for school purposes." In a
footnote, the court's opinion emphasized that "[a]t least two courts have
specifically concluded that the law of private trusts is applicable to land
held by the state in trust for schools."4
The Weiss court determined that there was no reason to treat federal
land grants for mental health purposes any differently than those for
educational purposes; the public land trust created by the AMHEA must be
governed by private trust law principles. In fact, the Supreme Court of
Mississippi recently cited the Weiss decision as support for applying to
38. Id. at 683.
39. Id. The court cited the Second Restatement of Trusts, which states that "[a]
trust cannot be created unless there is trust property." RPESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRuSTs § 74 (1959).
40. Weiss, 706 P.2d at 683.
41. 385 U.S. 458 (1967).
42. 624 P.2d 807 (Alaska 1981).
43. Lassen, 385 U.S. at 460.
44. Ic. at 466.
45. I& at 467.
46. University of Alaska, 624 P.2d at 813.
47. Id. at 813 n.6 (citing Keys v. Carter, 318 So. 2d 862, 864 (Miss. 1975); State
v. Rosenberger, 193 N.Wd 769, 773 (Neb. 1972)). For further discussion of
University ofAlaska, see infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. See also Wessells
v. State Dep't of Highways, 562 P.2d 1042, 1051 n.34 (Alaska 1977) (stating that the
grant by Congress under 48 U.S.C. § 353, which reserved two sections in each Alaska
township to support schools, along with its acceptance by the territory, created a
trust).
48. Weiss, 706 P2d at 683 n.3.
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school land trusts the common law rule prohibiting a trustee from "giving
away, appropriating to his own use, or otherwise[] disposing of the corpus
of a trust in derogation of the rights of the beneficiaries."' 9 Trusts for
mental health purposes may be at least as deserving of rigid protection as
those for school purposes. Communities may place a greater priority on
educational expenditures than mental health expenditures, thus increasing
the importance of a mental health trust as a base revenue guarantee.
While there is ample authority supporting this positionm a recent
Ninth Circuit case indicates that private trust law principles need not
always apply. In Price v. Hawaii,51 the court held that section 5(f) of the
Hawaii Admission Act ("HAA' N did not place common law trustee
duties upon the State of Hawaii. 53 Citing, inter alia, the Second
Restatement of Trusts,e the court began its analysis with the text of the
HAA itself 5 The court found that "it would be error to read the word
'public trust' to require that the State adopt any particular method and form
of management for the ceded lands."56 Thus, the state was restricted in
the management of the lands only by its own constitution and laws. The
court held that Hawaii law gave the state considerably broad authority to
manage the property and the income derived from that property; such
authority was more extensive than the rower which the federal statutory
language granted to Arizona in Lassen.
49. Hill v. Thompson, 564 So. 2d 1, 6 (Miss. 1989).
50. See, e.g., County ofSkamaniav. State, 685 P.2d 576 (Wash. 1984); Lassen, 385
U.S. 458. For a thorough discussion of whether private trust principles shouldgovern
school land trusts, see Sally K. Fairfax et al., ThMe School Trust Lands: A Fresh Look
at Conventional Wisdom, 22 ENVTL. L. 797 (1992).
51. 921 F.2d 950 (9th Cir. 1990).
52. Pub. L No. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4 (1959).
53. Price, 921 F.2d at 955.
54. The relevant part of the Second Restatement of Trusts provides that "[tihe
nature and extent of the duties and powers of the trustee are determined... by the
terms of the trust." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 164 (1959).
55. The 1HAA provides that
The lands ... together with the proceeds from the sale or other disposition of any
such lands and the income therefrom, shall be held by said State as a public trust for
the support of the publilic educational institutions, for the
betterment of the conditions of native Hawaiians... for the development of farm
and home ownership on as widespread a basis as possible for the making of public
improvements, and for the provision of lands forpublic use. Such lands, proceedsand income shall be managed and disposed of for one or mor of the foregoing
purposes in such manner as the constitution and laws of said Stateay provide, and
their use for any other object shall constitute a breach of trust for which suit may be
brought by the United States.
Hawaii Admission Act, Pub. L. No. 86-3, § 5(0, 73 Stat. 4 (1959) (emphasis added).
56. Price, 921 F.2d at 955.
57. Id. at 955 (distinguishing Lassen v. Arizona, 385 U.S. 458 (1967)).
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Nonetheless, the Price decision does not undermine the Alaska
Supreme Court's Weiss holding. The language of the AMHEA is
sufficiently different than that of the HAA to require a different outcome
than that in Price. The AMHEA states that the lands shall be
"administered," not simply "held," as a public trust. Furthermore, the
proceeds must first be used solely for the purpose of defraying the
necessary expenses of the mental health program. Hawaii has more
discretion in applying the income from lands under the HAA, and may
apply that income to various purposes. Finally, while the AMHEA gives
no deference to the internal laws of the Territory of Alaska, the HAA
expressly defers to Hawaii state law.
B. The Invalidity of the 1978 Legislation
After finding that the state breached the trust, the Alaska Supreme
Court reversed the superior court's holding that the legislation could not be
invalidated.58 The superior court felt constrained from invalidating the
legislation by the decision in State v. University of Alaska,59 but the
supreme court determined that the lower court had misinterpreted that
case.60 In University of Alaska, the federal government granted 100,000
acres to the state "for the exclusive use and benefit" of the university.
61
Years after the grant, the state included 5,040 acres of the trust land in a
state park. The supreme court held that this action did not breach the trust
as long as the state compensated the university for the fair value of the land
takeL 62 The court inferred that the state intended to compensate the
University for the loss of the land, and employed "the well recognized
canon of statutory construction that, when possible, legislation should be
construed in a way that upholds its validity."
The supreme court in Weiss distinguished University of Alaska because
the Weiss litigation did not involve a partial disposition of the trust lands
for a specific use. 4 Instead, it involved the removal of the entire corpus
from the trust, with no specific use identified for the former trust lands.65
The court decided that "it is not reasonable to infer that the legislature
meant to pay for a quantity of trust land approaching one million acres for
which in large part there is no present use. Thus, the payment remedy
58. Weiss, 706 P.2d at 683.
59. 624 P.2d 807 (Alaska 1981); see supra notes 42, 46 and accompanying text.
60. Weiss, 706 P.2d at 684.
61. University of Alaska, 624 P.2d at 811.
62. IM. at 816.
63. Id
64. Weiss, 706 P.2d at 684.
65. Id. at 684.
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imposed in University of Alaska is not present here.'" The court
reasoned that since the 1978 legislation went beyond the state's powers
regarding the trust lands, it must be held invalid.67
C. Remedies
After concluding that the state breached the trust and that the
redesignation legislation was invalid, the court turned to the issue of
remedies, holding that "the trust must be reconstituted to match as nearly
as possible the holdings which comprised the trust when the 1978 law
became effective."' The court remanded the case, directing the superior
court to make the requisite findings necessary for this reconstitution. The
supreme court did, however, offer "guidance" to the superior court. First,
all identifiable state lands that were once part of the mental health trust
were to be returned to the trust"6 If exchanges of former trust land had
been made, those properties that could be traced to an exchange for mental
health trust lands would be included in the trust. 0 For sales of former
trust lands, "the trust must be reimbursed for the fair market value at the
time of sale."' The overall goal of the court's remedy was "to restore the
trust to its position just prior to the conveyance effected by the
redesignation legislation."72
The court provided that the trial court should grant the state a "set-off"
for mental health expenditures made by the state since 197873 In other
words, if these expenditures exceeded the value of the lands sold, the state
need not compensate the trust for such lands when reconstituting the
trust 4 Although a set-off provision of this type may seem inconsistent
with private trust law principles that forbid the reduction of the corpus of
a trust,75 the Second Restatement of Trusts states that "[t]he trustee is
entitled to indemnity out of the trust estate for expenses properly incurred
66. 1d.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. IM.
70. Id
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. TIs set-off provision of the Weiss case was later cited by the Alaska
Supreme Court in Southwest Region School District v. State Department of
Education, 723 P.2d 636, 637 (Alaska 1986), in which general state expenditures on
schools were held to offset any deficiency in the school budget funded by the
cigarette tax.
74. Weiss, 706 P.2d at 684.
75. See, e.g., RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 176 (1959) ("The trustee is
under a duty to the beneficiary to use reasonable care and skill to preserve the trust
property.").
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by him in the administration of the trust. 76  The Tenth Circuit has
interpreted this section to provide that "[elven though the expenses arose
while in breach of the trust, if the trustee has reimbursed the trust fund for
any loss that resulted from the breach, administrative expenses are properly
recoverable." The court thus allowed the State of New Mexico to set-
off administrative expenses, incurred while in breach of a public land trust
for a miners' hospital, against its compensation to the trust. 8 To the
extent that Alaska's mental health expenditures can be classified as
"administrative expenses," set-off may be justified under these private trust
law principles.
D. Rights of Bona Fide Purchasers and Conveyancees
A footnote to the Weiss opinion is particularly noteworthy in that the
court declined to address questions of title held by bona fide purchasers
and conveyancees of former trust lands.79  The court found it
"unnecessary" to address those issues at the time.8° Since then, however,
the issues have created considerable uncertainty over title rights and have
proved to be a burden on the state's land administration.81 Perhaps the
court declined to address the issue because it believed that conveyancees
and bona fide purchasers would be unaffected by the remedy provision of
the opinion! 2
The court's failure to address the rights of bona fide purchasers may
be an isolated point; it is unclear how much of the former land belongs to
bona fide purchasers. Some land was not really "purchased" from the
76. Id. § 244.
77. United States v. New Mexico, 536 F.2d 1324, 1329 (10th Cir. 1976).
78. Id. at 1329-30.
79. Weiss, 706 P2d at 684 n.4. A bona fide purchaser is defined as "[o]ne who
has purchased property for value without any notice of any defects in the title of the
seller." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 177 (6th ed. 1990).
80. Weiss, 706 P2d at 684 n.4.
81. Telephone Interview with G. Thomas Koester, Special Assistant Attorney
General of Alaska (October 5, 1992). Thus far, the plaintiffs, when requested to do
so by the state, have agreed to modify the superior court's injunction which prevents
the state from transferring title of original trust lands to third parties. See infra notes
124-133 and accompanying text. This negotiation process has added an additional
procedural hurdle for the state.
82. The Weiss court noted that transactions with conveyancees and bona fide
purchasers might be covered by the following provision: "In the event exchanges have
been made, those properties which can be traced to an exchange involving mental
health lands will also be included in the trust" See Weiss, 706 PF2d at 684. Thus, if
the state has received property of equal value in the exchange, that property winlo
to the trust, with the bona fide purchaser able to retain title to the former trust lans.
The results would be similar where the lands were sold for cash proceeds, except such
proceeds would be subject to the state's right of set-off before being transferred to
the trust.
1992]
354 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:2
state. Municipalities that were simply given the land by the state would be
donees of trust property and would thus hold interests inferior to those of
the beneficiaries of the trust.83 Other lands, such as those redesignated by
the legislature as state parks or wildlife refuges, would still be in state
hands and could be transferred back to the trust.5 "
The most difficult determinations involve individuals who actually
purchased former trust land from the state. Since they gave the state value
in payment of the lands, they theoretically should be protected by the
state's obligation to transfer proceeds of sales to the trust.85 However, the
Second Restatement of Trusts provides that "a transferee of trust property
takes subject to the trust if at any time prior to the transfer he has notice
that the trustee is committing a breach of trust in making the transfer,
although he gives value before he has notice." 6 The Restatement further
provides: "A person has notice of a breach of trust if (a) he knows or
should know of the breach of trust... ." 7 Since the creation of the trust
is a matter of public record, a purchaser for value may have difficulty
showing the requisite lack of notice to obtain bona fide purchaser status.
Thus, if the settlement process deteriorates and litigation ensues, two
related issues that would be contested are: (1) whether a constructive notice
83. See RESrATEmENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 289 (1959) ("If the trustee in
breach of trust transfers trust property and no value is given for the transfer, the
transferee does not hold the property free of the trust, although he had no notice of
the trust.").
84. The current status of the original mental trust lands is as follows:
Conveyed to third parties 46,000 acres
Conveyed to municipalities 43,000
Land Settlements
conveyed to Native corporations 36,000
conveyed to University of Alaska 3,000
Condemned 5,000
Leased to third parties 89,225
Material sales 1,900
Mining claims 60,000
Legislatively designated areas
State forests 113,289
Parks, wildlife refuges, etc. 243,600
Inter-agency land management agreements 4,500
Unencumbered 352,386
TOTAL 997,900 acres
State's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to
Issues Raised in Environmental Intervenors' Complaint, at 17, Weiss v. State, (No.
4FA-82-2208 Civil) (filed August 27, 1992). Many of the acreage figures are
approximation,, causing the total shown to be 997,900 acres instead of one million
acres.
85. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
86. RESTA'EMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTs § 311 (1959).
87. Id. § 297.
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standard should be used, and, (2) if so, at what point constructive notice is
deemed to have arisen.8
IV. THE LEGISLATURE'S RESPONSE
A. The Pre-1991 Acts
The Weiss decision did not specify the nature of the state's obligation
with respect to managing the trust land. Since the decision in 1985, there
have been four legislative acts aimed at effecting a compromise between
the mental health plaintiffs and the state. The first act, passed in 1986,
created an Interim Mental Health Trust Commission within the Department
of Natural Resources ("DNR').8 9 The Commission was empowered to
approve any conveyance by the Commissioner of Natural Resources, who
was given responsibility for the actual management of the trust lands.90
The Commissioner was also required to inventory the trust lands and audit
all transactions involving former trust lands.9' The 1986 Act also created
a special trust account within the state general fund to receive the proceeds
from management of the mental health lands.
The act which followed this interim solution, the first actual attempt at
a compromise, came in 1987.9 The statute proposed to reconstitute the
trust with lands in state parks and game refuges that had a substantial
probability of remaining under state ownership in perpetuity. The state
would then compensate the trust each year with eight percent of the fair
market value of the former trust lands. This proposed settlement created
a problem in that the plaintiffs and the DNR widely differed on the
valuation of the trust lands.93 According to plaintiffs' counsel, the reason
for the large discrepancy was the state's inability to compensate the trust
88. For example, the 1978 legislation which removed the land from trust status
may not have been considered a breach had the state made the specified
appropriations to compensate the trust. It is questionable that a purchaser of former
trust lands would be charged with investigating subsequent appropriations.
Furthermore, University of Alaska could be construed as providing notice that even
if a breach existed, monetary damages, rather than the land itself, would be the
proper remedy. See State v. University of Alaska, 624 P.2d 807 (Alaska 1981). On
the other hand, the Weiss decision in 1985 likely would be construed as providing
sufficient public notice of the breach of the trust to destroy bona fide purchaser
status. See Weiss, 706 P.2d at 683.
89. 1986 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 132.
90. Id. at § 2d.
91. Id. at § 2a.
92. 1987 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 48, § 25.
93. The plaintiffs' experts valued the trust lands at $2,243,000.000. DNR's
designee valued them at approximately $564,700,000. See Minority Recommendations
of Interim Mental Healtl Trust Commission, at 28 (February 1, 1990) (on file with
Alaska Law Review).
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for what the lands were actually worth.9 The Commissioner stated that
she was forced to declare an impasse because the Commission failed to use
the fair market value in its calculations, making it impossible to satisfy
simultaneously the legislative requirements to use fair market value and to
adopt the Commission's recommendations. 5 Regardless of its cause, this
discrepancy rendered settlement infeasible.
The 1990 compromise effort attempted to alleviate the land valuation
problem by removing the required correlation between trust income and
land value.96 The 1990 Acte' provided that "(a]ll land within legislative
designations on September 7, 1987, constitutes the corpus of the mental
health land trust.' 8 The "rent" from these lands would consist of six
percent of the state's unrestricted general fund revenue each fiscal year.99
This provision, however, was unacceptable to the plaintiffs because the
trust would not receive a sufficiently large stream of income.'O
B. The 1991 Act
Lengthy negotiations between the state and the plaintiffs resulted in
chapter 66 of Alaska's 1991 Session Laws.'0 ' The 1991 Act'2 has two
primary features: it reconstitutes the trust with lands as similar as possible
to the original trust lands, and it establishes specific procedures which the
state must follow in administering the trust The Act also proposes to
return approximately half of the original trust lands while other state lands
94. Telephone Interview with David Walker, Attorney, Law Office of David
Walker, ancfJames Gottstein, Attorney, Law Office of James Gottstein (January 9,
1992).
95. Letter from Lennie Gorsuch, Commissioner of Department of Natural
Resources, to Thelma Langdon, Chair of Alaska Mental Health Board (April 17,
1990) (on file with Alaska Law Review).
96. 1990 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 210.
97. The terms "1990 Act" and "chapter 210" are used interchangeably throughout
this note to refer to chapter 210 of the 1990 Alaska Session Laws.
98. 1990 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 210, § 4.
99. Id § 2.
100. Since the plaintiffs valued the land at $2,43,000,000, see supra note 93, six
percent of the general fund revenue fell short of the compensation offered under the
1987 Act (eight percent of the fair market value). The state estimates the total
unrestricted general fund revenues for the year ended June 30, 1992 to be
$2,199,400,000. Telephone Interview with representative of State of Alaska
Department of Revenue, Treasury Division (November 6, 1992). The plaintiffs
feared in 1990, as they do today, that general fund revenues will decline as the
Prudhoe Bay oil reserves become less productive. Telephone Interview with G.
Thomas Koester, Attorney, Law Office of G. Thomas Koester (Sept. 24, 1991).
101. 1991 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 66.
102. The terms "1991 Act" and "chapter 66" are used interchangeably throughout
this note to refer to chapter 66 of the 1991 Alaska Session Laws.
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will replace the half of the original trust lands that are now in private hands
or subject to use restrictions decreasing their value.
The original lands which the 1991 Act automatically returns to the trust
include unencumbered land, land subject to various short-term leases,
permits, or contracts which the plaintiffs viewed as income-maximizing,
and land in the Haines and Tanana Valley State Forests.1'9 The Act
authorizes the return of other original land to the trust at the option of the
plaintiffs. This land may not include any land that has been conveyed out
of state ownership, or any land in legislatively designated state parks,
forests, or game refuges (with the exception of the Haines and Tanana
Valley State Forests). 4 As compensation for land not returned to the
trust, replacement land exchanges are to be negotiated between the
plaintiffs and the Commissioner of Natural Resources.1 5 The Act
requires that such exchanges be "based on equal fair market value"' 6 and
"involve, as nearly as practicable, land of comparable character. ' ' 7
Finally, chapter 66 lists additional factors to be considered when deciding
upon the appropriate land to be exchanged, including: diversity of the
character of the land, development and income-generating potential, public
benefits, benefits to the trust, public interest and the efficiency of land
managementY18
Recognizing that the substitution provision of this proposal surely
would cause continued valuation disputes, the 1991 Act gives the Alaska
Supreme Court original jurisdiction to rule on all disputes arising from the
reconstitution of the trust 0 9 As security for compensation, the Act
"hypothecates" certain state lands to the mental health trust. 10
Foreclosure on the hypothecated lands would occur upon default of the
state's duties or upon failure to reconstitute the trust by December 1,
1994."' In addition, the statute calls for contributions from unrestricted
103. Id. § 54(1)-(5).
104. Id. § 54(5)-(6).
105. I1& § 55(f).
106. I& § 55(c).
107. Id. § 55(d). Among the factors to be considered in determining comparable
character are tehain, use, location, development potential, income potential,
accessibility and other physical characteristics. Id.
108. Id. § 55(e).
109. I1& § 57(a).
110. Id. § 56(a). A complete list of such land is listed in "Lands Hypothecated to
the Mental Health Trust, May 1991," located inthe Department of Natural Resources
office in Anchorage. Id. The term "hypothecate" means "ft]o pledge property as
security or collateral for a debt. Generally, there is no physical transfer of the
pledged property to the lender, nor is the lender given title to the property; though
he has the right to sell the pledged property upon default." BLAcK's LAW
DICrONARY 7-42 (6th ed. 1990).
111. 1991 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 66, § 56(d).
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state revenues to the mental health trust income account in support of the
trust during the transition to a fully developed land management program.
Such contributions will follow a sliding scale beginning in 1992 at six
percent annually, gradually declining to zero percent by the year 2003.112
Chapter 66 also created the Mental Health Trust Authority ("MHTA"),
which will act as trustee of the reconstituted trust. The Act also defines the
beneficiaries of the trust and explains generally that which a comprehensive
mental health program should entail." 3 Lastly, chapter 66 does not take
effect until the superior court has dismissed the lawsuit and the time for
appeal has expired." The superior court will not dismiss the suit unless
it determines that the settlement agreement is in the best interests of the
beneficiaries of the trust."5
V. THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
A. Superior Court Decisions on Remand
1. Intervention. After the Alaska Supreme Court remanded Weiss in
1985, the superior court decided several crucial cases impacting the
litigation. A 1988 decision" 6 involved the designation of trust
beneficiaries. The original plaintiff class consisted of those fitting the
traditional definition of "mentally ill." 7  Groups consisting of (or
representing) mentally retarded and mentally defective individuals and
112. 111 § 11(c).
113. Id. § 26 (to be codified at ALASKA SrAT. § 47.30.056(b)). The beneficiaries
are to include:(1) the mentally ill;(2) the mentally defective and retarded;(3) chronic alcoholics suffering from psychosis;(4) senile people who as a result of their senility suffer major mental illness; and(5) other persons needing mental health services, as the legislature may determine.
Id. The "comprehensive" mental health program should include "services for the
mentally ill, community mental health services, services for the developmentally
disabled, alcoholism services, and services for children, youth, adults, and seniors with
mental disorders." Id.
114. Id § 58.
115. See supra note 5.
116. Weiss v. State, Case No. 4FA-82-2208 Civil, Memorandum Decision and
Order, Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Fourth Judicial District, April 27,1988
[hereinafter April 27, 1988 Weiss Memorandum Decision].
117. As later defined in chapter 66, the "mentallyr ill" includes people with
schizophrenia, delusional disorders, mood disorders, anxiety disorders, somatophorm
disorders, organic mental disorders, personality disorders and dissociative disorders.
1991 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 66, § 26 to be codified at ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.056(d)).
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chronic alcohol abusers suffering from psychoses sought intervention as
beneficiaries under the AMHEA."8
The State argued that it was within their discretion to determine which
groups were to be served by the mental health program and thus benefit
from the mental health lands trust According to the State, this
interpretation was consistent with the AMHEA's initial grant of plenary
authority to the Territory of Alaska over its own mental health program.
The original plaintiff class joined in the State's argument in order to
maintain the small size of the beneficiary class. The intervenors countered
that the AMHEA's legislative history demonstrated an intent to fund a
program with a broad beneficiary base.
The court allowed the plaintiffs' intervention as beneficiaries, rendering
a broad interpretation of the class of intended beneficiaries. While
acknowledging "support for the position taken by each of the parties,"'1
the court concluded that:
Congress intended that the mental health lands public trust benefit the
recipients of the services of the comprehensive mental health program,
which group must include, at a minimum, the mentally ill who may require
hospitalization, and the mentally defective and retarded. The court
concludes that it is within the discretion of the State to include other
groups as recipients of services by the mental health program but it is not
within the discretion of the State to exclude either of those two groups12°
An additional intervention issue arose subsequent to the 1991
legislation, when the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund filed a motion for
intervention on behalf of eight environmental groups. The Defense Fund
sought to challenge the concept of a settlement based on chapter 66.21
After the settlement agreement was submitted to the court for preliminary
approval, the environmentalists raised specific objections to the
agreement'
118. April 27, 1988 Weiss Memorandum Decision, supra note 116, at 2-3.
119. Id.
120. IR at 17.
121. Complaint of Intervenors, Weiss v. State (No. 4FA-82-2208 Civil) (lodged
October 26, 1991) [hereinafter Complaint of Intervenors]. The Complaint was fied
as of the grantmg of intervention on December 3, 1991. While the terms
"environmentalists" and "environmental intervenors" are used in this note to refer
generally to the parties being represented by the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund,
the intervenors are: Alaska Center for the Environment, Alaska Sportfishing
Association, Lynn Canal Conservation, Northern Alaska Environmental Center,
Sierra Club, Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, Susitna Valley Association and
Trout Unlimited.
122. See infra Part VI.C. for an analysis of the issues presented by the
environmental intervenors and their impact on the settlement.
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2. Lis Pendens. In July 1990, the superior court allowed plaintiffs to file
a re-notice of lis pendens12 on former trust property and enjoined the
state from transferring title to third parties pending the outcome of the
Weiss litigation.u The court cited three factors to be weighed in ruling
on a preliminary injunction: (1) whether the party requesting the injunction
faces irreparable harm, (2) whether adequate protection exists for the party
opposing the injunction, and (3) whether the proponent of the injunction
has raised substantial questions as to the merits of the case.12
The State argued that the provisions of the 1990 Acte remedied the
state's breach of its fiduciary duty to the trust by providing adequate
compensation to the beneficiaries.'2 The State also urged that the
plaintiffs' sole remedy should be payment of compensation rather than
reconstitution of the trust. Judge Greene found that "[t]he fallacy of these
arguments is that they ignore the fact that the state may not unilaterally
settle this lawsuit.""i Furthermore, under the supreme court's Weiss
decision, a compensation remedy for the original breach was not adequate.
Judge Greene therefore concluded that "[t]his lawsuit will not come to its
conclusion until a final adjudication on the merits reconstituting the trust
123. "Lis pendens" is defined as: "Jurisdiction, power, or control which courts
acquire over property in litigation pending action anduntil final judgment." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 932 (6th ed. 1990). "Notice of lis pendens" is further defined as
"[a] notice filed on public records for the purpose of warning all persons that the title
to certain prop erty is in litigation, and that they are in danger of being bound by an
adverse judgient. The notice is for the purpose of preserving rights pending
litigation." Id. (citing Mitchell v. Federal LanfBank of St. Louis, 174 S.W2d 671,674
(Ark. 1943)). Black's further states that "while it is simply a notice of pending
litigation the effect thereof on the owner of property is ostraining." Id. (citing
Beefy King Int'l, Inc. v. Vei~le, 464 F2d 1102, 1104(5th Cir. 1972)).
Alaska has codified its lis pendens doctrine at Alaska Statutes section 09.45.790:
In an action affecting the title to or the right of possession of real property, the
plaintiff... may record in the office of the recorder of the recording district in
which the pioperty is situated a notice of the pendency of the action, containing the
names of the parties, and the object of the action or defense, and a description of the
property affected in that district. From the time of filing the notice for record, a
purchaser, holder of a contract or option to purchase, or encumbrancer of the
property affected has constructive notice of the pendency of the action and of its
pendency against parties designated by their real names.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.790 (Supp. 1991).
124. Weiss v. State, Case No. 4FA-82-2208 Civil, Memorandum Decision and
Order, at 13, Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Fourth Judicial District, July 12,
1990 [hereinafter July 12,1990 Weiss Memorandum Decision]. Notices of lis pendens
were originally filed in August, 1984 but subsequently expunged from the land
records in November, 1984.
125. Id. at 7.
126. See suipra note 96 and accompanying text for a further discussion of chapter
210 of the 1990 session laws.
127. July 12, 1990 Weiss Memorandum Decision, supra note 124, at 8.
128. IUL
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is reached or a bilateral settlement is reached which is approved by the
court under the provisions of Alaska [Rule of Civil Procedure] 23(e)."'1 29
Judge Greene also refused to grant the state an injunction "barring the
plaintiffs from challenging title to any mental health lands, filing lis
pendens as to such lands, or taking any other action which would cas[t] a
legal cloud on the current record title to such lands.""13  While the
decision denied the state's request for injunction, a footnote to the
memorandum decision and order acknowledged the possible adverse effects
of such a denial on third parties:
The court is not unmindful of nor unsympathetic to the problems which
may be created for third-party holders of lands originally designated as
mental health trust lands. It is very possible that innocent third-parties will
have their rights to those lands tied up in court for a period of time. There
is no question that such actions may be harmful to individuals. However,
it must be stressed that the problem arises not because of actions of
plaintiffs or this court but because of the actions of the State in violating
its trust responsibilities when it redesignated mental health trust lands as
general grant lands in 1978. Had the legislature taken its trust obligation
seriously, these innocent third-parties would not have been adversely
affected.!"
Judge Greene further observed that "[t]hese lands are clearly income-
producing properties which could be managed to produce long term income
for the trust itself,'3 and that "since the legislature's repeal of the statute
creating the Interim Mental Health Trust Commission, there is no other
way to protect the lands other than through court action."'33
B. Valuation Issues
Any proposal calling for full reconstitution of the trust, whether by
substituted lands or by cash, will inevitably involve valuation disputes.
Given the unsuccessful history of past valuation attempts,'3 it is likely
that the Alaska Supreme Court will be called upon to resolve these
disputes. When future disputes come before the court, it would be wise to
keep in mind the source of the entire dispute: the state's unilateral
disregard for the trust which Congress created for the benefit of Alaska's
mental health program. Since a chapter 66-based settlement accommodates
129. Id. at 8-9. As further justification, the decision stated that "where an
appellate court issues a specific mandate, a trial court has no authority to deviate
fiom it." Id. at 9.
130. M at 9.
131. IM. at 11 n.3.
132. IM. at 13.
133. Id.
134. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
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the state by failing to require the return of lands conveyed from the trust,
the plaintiffs should be entitled to very careful scrutiny of substituted lands.
The number of potential valuation disputes might be greatly reduced
if the supreme court were to decide on acceptable valuation methods early
in the post-settlement reconstitution process. Disagreement over such
methods was one of the principal causes of the failure to settle under the
1987 legislation. The DNR urged that a "comparable-sales" method should
be used to determine the fair market value for all lands. Meanwhile,
though the Attorney General's office suggested that the "income-
capitalization" method was legitimate, it claimed that the data relied upon
by the plaintiffs' experts was inadequate with respect to actual mineral
endowments, the timing of successful operations, and worldwide markets.
The Commission adopted the view put forth by the plaintiffs, who argued
that an income-capitalization approach, whereby the land's value is
calculated based on the projected income stream it will produce, more
accurately captured the true fair market value of the mineral reserves. In
the settling plaintiffs' view, since lands containing mineral reserves
comprise the bulk of the trust's value, the determination of the proper
appraisal method will have a crucial impact on the value of the
reconstituted trust.
The proper valuation method depends upon the type of land under
consideration. The income-capitalization method is more appropriate for
income-producing lands such as those containing mineral deposits. The
trust likely would derive income from leases of the mineral rights or joint
venture mining projects, rather than from the outright sale of these lands.
In contrast, a comparable-sales approach does seem more appropriate for
those urban and suburban lands likely to be sold for commercial
development. Thus, the proper appraisal method should be tied to the
characteristics of a specific parcel of land and the trust's anticipated
method for deriving income from such land.135
135. The DNR's position, as evidenced by the Minority Recommendations of the
Interim Mental Health Trust Commission, raises several important points. First, to
prevent double-counting in the valuation process, each acre of land should be valued
according to only one anticipated land use. The plaintiffs justify such double-
counting because the surrounding land will increase in value to compensate for loss
of some surface land in places where mining or drilling occurs. Telephone Interview
with James Gottstein, Attorney, Law Office of James Gottstein (February 24, 1992).
Also, it may be inaccurate to calculate the present value of income streams from
mineral rights using the present date as the target It would be more accurate to
calculate such present values as of the date of anticipated development. However,
the plaintiffs could counter with the argument that [s]ome speculation is inherent
in the ascertainment of value of all resource property, be it mineral, oil, gas or
otherwise." United States v. Silver Queen Mining Co., 285 F.2d 506, 510 (10th Cir.
1960). In United States v. 22.80 Acres of Land in San Benito County, 839 F2d 1362
(9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit cited Silver Queen in refusing to reverse the district
court's approval of an appraisal methodology where a disount factor was not
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VI. ASSESSING THE PROPOSED SErrLEMENTs
A. The Plaintiffs' Interests
The settlement alternatives seem to be land-based, cash-based, or some
combination of the two. The chapter 66 compromise provides primarily
a land-based settlement Since a lump-sum cash settlement would be
impossibly expensive at this time, any cash-based settlement would have
to include continuing annual appropriations from the legislature to
reconstitute the trust, in addition to those annual appropriations already
made to fund the mental health program. According to the lead plaintiffs'
attorney who negotiated chapter 66 with the legislature, the Hickel
Administration will veto any reconstitution of the trust based on continued
general fund supportYL3 Thus, the practical parameters of a settlement
seem limited to that which reconstitutes the trust with land.
A reconstituted land trust benefits the plaintiffs because it provides a
higher degree of permanence than legislative appropriations. Thus, while
it may be unlikely that a reconstituted land trust will generate enough
revenues to fund fully a comprehensive mental health program in the
future, it would provide an important permanent base guarantee.
When Congress created the original trust under the AMEA, it clearly
envisioned a land trust. In order to provide security and longevity
comparable to that of a land trust, any alternative would require a great
deal of cash up-front, which seems unlikely to occur. Additionally, the
legislative history of the AMHEA suggests that if income from the land
trust were not enough to sustain a comprehensive mental health program,
the state would be obligated to supplement the trust revenues. 37
However, the state, arguing that the AMHEA was only meant to place the
applied.
136. Telephone interview with David T. Walker, Attorney, Law Office of David
T. Walker (Jan. 9, 1992). According to Mr. Walker, the administration does,
however, recognize that additional expenditures may be necessary to supplement the
income from a land-based trust. Id.
137. See, e.g., Letter from Wesley A. D'Ewart, Assistant Secretary of the Interior,
to Senator James E. Murray, Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs(January 9, 1956), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3645. The AMHBA "would
have the effect of transferring to the Territory responsibility for the administration
of the Territory's mental health program." Id. at 3646. 'The revenues obtained from
this land grant shall materially assist the Territory in assuming full financial
responsibility for the care and treatment of the mentay ill." Id. (emphasis added).
Tins implies the understanding that part of the Territory's responsibility would be to
support the mental health program beyond the "material assistance" provided by the
land grant. D'Ewart recognized that '"[t is also possible, however, that the land
grant may be insufficient to sustain the Teritory's financial responsibility under the
program, and if that is so, the Territory should not be deterred from using funds from
other sources to sustain it" Id. at 3647.
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territory on equal footing with other states, would contest an interpretation
compelling it to make any appropriations.
Chapter 66 eliminates the set-off provision contained in the Weiss
opinion, and this aspect of the 1991 Act is extremely beneficial for the
plaintiffs. The Weiss opinion provided that the amount by which mental
health expenditures exceeded income from the trust lands could be set-off
against the reimbursement required for trust land that had been sold."3
Since expenditures could conceivably exceed trust land income, it is
possible that the trust would not be compensated at all for lands that were
sold. Because chapter 66 eliminates this provision, the new trust will in
fact contain land equal in value to the original lands. Although the
plaintiffs are confident that they would prevail in any litigation aimed at
restoring land title to the trust,139 they could not achieve the particular
benefits of chapter 66 by continued litigation of the dispute.
Those plaintiffs opposing the chapter 66-based settlement do so for
several reasons."4 Frst, chapter 66 charges the MITA, rather than the
state, with the trustee's role of managing the lands for profit This scheme
differs from that originally created by the AMHEA, which envisioned the
state acting as trustee. The state, however, was derelict in its duties as
original trustee. 4 One argument against the new arrangement is that if
the MI-TA bears the trustee expenses, the ultimate cash flow to the
beneficiaries could decrease. A counterargument can be made that
additional revenues will be generated because the body managing the trust
lands clearly has the beneficiaries' best interests in mind and that this will
compensate for any additional trustee expenses passed on to the
beneficiaries. Furthermore, even if the state acts as trustee, if private trust
law were applied, the state would be entitled to indemnification by the trust
for expenses incurred as trustee.'42 In other words, the ultimate cash
flow to the beneficiaries could decrease under the original arrangement as
well.
138. State v. Weiss, 706 P.2d 681, 684 (Alaska 1985).
139. Telephone Interview with James B. Gottstein, Attorney, Law Office of James
B. Gottstein, and David T. Walker, Attorney, Law Office of David T. Walker (Jan.
9,1992).
140. Currently, the only plaintiffs that oppose the settlement are the chronic
alcoholics suffering from psychoses, represented by Philip Volland. Mr. Volland, who
initially adopted a "wait and see" attitude toward the settlement and raised many of
the concerns outlined in the text, is now firmly opposed to the current settlement
agreement Telephone interview with Philip R. Volland, Attorney, Rice, Volland,
and Gleason (Jan. 9, 1992), subsequent interview (March 19, 1
141. See IM-JITC Report, supra note 27, at 6.
142. RESTAimENT (SEcoND) oF TRuSrs § 244 (1959) ("The trustee is entitled
to indemnity out of the trust estate for expenses properly incurred by him in the
administration of the trust.").
[Vol. 9:2
MENTAL HEALTH LAND TRUST
The dissenting plaintiffs also object to the chapter 66 provisions
because a cash-based settlement would be easier to administer than a land-
based settlement According to this rationale, the additional delays inherent
in reconstituting a land trust and the possibility of continuous litigation to
defend the trust's title to lands more than offset the "security" of a
reconstituted land trust. Although the state does not seem to be willing
and/or able to provide such a settlement, 43 the dissenting plaintiffs'
argument is compelling in light of the threat to the settlement posed by the
environmentalist intervenors. 1' Substitutions will definitely create
problems, especially if the state does not return to the trust former trust
lands owned by municipalities or within state parks and refuges.' 5
Furthermore, most of the valuable land in the state has been designated for
specific uses since statehood, so choosing replacement lands with
sufficiently high value is likely to be an arduous task. Even if the trust
were to be successfully reconstituted with land, subsequent problems are
likely to arise in administering the land-based trust.
B. The State's Interests
The state's primary constraint in negotiating a settlement is a lack of
cash funds with which to compensate the trust. Beyond this, the state has
an interest in reducing its involvement in costly and time-consuming
litigation with respect to the trust.146 The state hopes to manage the trust
lands at their highest and best use, consistent with the legislature's broad
authority over all state land under the Alaska Constitution. 7 However,
such powers do not necessarily extend to lands contained in the federally
created land trust4 To the extent the state has already given trust lands
to municipalities or native corporations organized under the Alaska Native
143. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
144. See infra Part VI.C.
145. Chapter 66 does not provide for the return of these lands to the trust. 1991
Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 66, §§ 54-55.
146. See, e.g., 1991 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 96, § 85 (appropriating $500,000 from the
mental health trust income account in the general fund to the Department of Law
to pay costs associated with the Weiss litigation for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1991). The state is currently paying the plaintiffs' attorney's fees, and the
continuation of this practice has led at least one observer to refer to chapter 66 as
a "lawyer's full employment act" Interview with Philip R. Volland, Attorney, Rice,
Volland, and Gleason (March 19, 1992).
147. ALASKA CONST. art VIII, § 2 ("rhe legislature shall provide for the
utilization, development, and conservation of all natural resources belonging to the
State, including land and waters, for the maximum benefit of its people.").
148. University of Alaska held that, despite article VIII, section 2 of the Alaska
Constitution, the state could only remove trust land if it compensated the trust for
the fair market value of the land removed. State v. University of Alaska, 624 P.2d
807, 815-16 (Alaska 1991).
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Claims Settlement Act ("ANCSA"),'49 the state vehemently opposes
invalidating such conveyances.Y° Likewise, the state wants to prevent
the invalidation of legislative designations of former trust lands as state
parks or wildlife refuges.
The current uncertainty over title to former trust lands is the primary
incentive for the state to reach a settlement. As a result of the July 1990
injunctioni51 and public notice of the trust's claim to former trust lands,
it has been difficult to sell trust land purchased from the state.
Furthermore, those who have purchased these trust lands cannot obtain
patents 52 from the state, and projects such as the Wishbone Hill coal
mine have been delayed. 53 The injunction, coupled with confusion over
title, gives the state sufficient incentive to relinquish its set-off right in
order to reach an agreement with the plaintiffs.
C. The Environmentalist Intervenors' Interests
The intervention by eight environmental groups creates potential
problems for the current proposed settlement agreement. The
environmentalists' claims can be classified in two general categories. The
first involves the agreement's disregard for Alaska's public land
management policies; the second concerns the legislative process involved
in passing chapter 66 .M
1. Public Land Management Issues. The settlement has been attacked
on constitutional grounds, based on article VIII, section 10 of the Alaska
149. See 43 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1988).
150. It is unlikely that former trust lands which have been conveyed to native
corporations organized under ANCSA can be returned to the trust. See .Tyonek
Native Corp. v. Secretary of the Interior, 836 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that
to the extent mental health trust lands have not yet been patented to the State by the
Secretary of the Interior as required by the Alaska Statehood Act, they are
withdrawn from appropriation under the public land law) (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1610(a)
(1988)).
151. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
152. A "patent," in this context, refers to "[tlhe instrument by which a state or
government grants public lands to an individual." BLAcK's LAW Dlcn1ONARY 1125
(6th ed. 1990).
153. The Wishbone Hill coal mine is a proposed surface coal mine located in the
Matanuska River valley near Palmer. The state has been prohibited from issuinga
surface coal mining permit to Idemitsu Alaska, Inc., the project's developer, by the
superior court's preliminary injunction issued July 9, 1990. See supra note 124 and
accompanying text. The superior court denied Idemitsu's subsequent motion to
modify this preliminary injunction. Weiss v. State, Case No. 4FA-82-2208 Civil,
Memorandum Decision and Order, Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Fourth
Judicial District, April 15, 1991.
154. The material in this section traces the 11 counts set out in the Complaint of
Intervenors, supra note 121.
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Constitution.'15 The constitution requires public hearings and, arguably,
a best-interests determination before lands may be transferred to out-of-
state ownership.'m This restriction applies to such transfer only if the
MHTA is not designated a state entity. Ifthe MHTA is designated a state
entity, the transfer would not be considered out-of-state ownership.
Because the MUTA is managing lands to maximize income for selected
beneficiaries (as opposed to the state), and since it is arguably not subject
to public scrutiny, the MITA may be classified as something other than
a state entity. 57 Thus, transfers of state land to MHTA may be subject
to this constitutional provision.'-
Alaska Statutes sections 38.04 and 38.05 contain the state's principal
safeguards of the public interest, as required by article VIII, section 10 of
the Alaska ConstitutionA59 In addition to requiring a public hearing,"6
these sections also require land use planning and classification,1
61
multiple purpose use of state land,16 and reservation of public rights of
access to public water and public land.'6 Chapter 66 exempts the
MHTA from all of these requirements except public notice.1' The
environmentalists claim that this exemption violates article IX, section 15
of the Alaska Constitution65 and Alaska Statutes section 37.13.01016
155. ALASKA CoNsT. art. VIII, § 10.
156. Id. ("No disposals or leases of state lands, or interests therein, shall be made
without prior public notice and other safeguards of the public interest as may be
prescribed by law").
157. Alaska Commercial Fishing & Agriculture Bank v. 0/S Alaska Coast, 715
P.2d 707 (Alaska 1986), addressed whether the Bank ("CFAB") is a "state agency"
for the purpose of maritime lien foreclosure proceedings. The Alaska Supreme
Court stated that it does not address the status of purported state agencies "in the
abstract," but rather "consider[s] the entity's status solely for the narrow purposes
necessary to that litigation." Id. at 708-09. In making the determination, the court
will "balance an entity's autonomy against the state's retained control." Id. at 711.
158. Section 10 of chapter 66 requires the MHTA to give public notice in the
manner provided under Alaska Statutes sections 38.05.945(b) and (c). 1991 Alaska
Sess. Laws ch. 66, § 10; ALASKA STAT. §§ 38.05.945(b), (c) (1989).
159. ALASKA STAT. §§ 38.04.005-.910, 38.05.005-.990 (1989).
160. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.946 (1989).
161. ALASKA STAT. § 38.04.005-.910 (1989).
162. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 38.04.065(b), 38.04.910(5), 38.05.285 (1989).
163. ALASKA STAT. §§ 38.04.055 (1989). Forest plans must take into account
protection of fish and wildlife habitats, wetlands, water quality and soils. Id. §
41.17.230. The statutes also require appraisals of land before disposal, id. § 38.05.840,
as well as reservations of rights to the state in connection with sales and leases. Id.§ 38.05.125.
164. 1991 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 66, § 10 (codified at ALASKA STAT. § 37.14.009(Supp. 1991)).
165. ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 15 ("At least twenty-five per cent of all mineral
lease rentals, royalties, [and] royalty sale proceeds... received by the State shall be
placed in a permanent fund, the principal of which shall be used only for those
income-producing investments specifically designated by law as eligible for permanent
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by not requiring any deposit of trust income to the general funds until the
needs of the mental health program have been met. 67
The intervenors argue that under both the Alaska Constitution and the
common law, the state is viewed as a trustee of the state's public lands and
resources for the benefit of all citizens. This argument is grounded in both
the state's general authority under article VII, section 2'6' and the
"common use" clause in article VIII, section 3 of the Alaska
Constitution. 69 Alaska case law has clarified these constitutional
provisions.
In Herscher v. State Department of Commerce,70 the Alaska
Supreme Court referred to the state as "trustee of the natural resources for
the benefit of its citizens."'' In a similar context, the court had
previously described migrating schools of fish in inland waters as being
"held in trust for the benefit of all the people of the state."' The
court's discussion of the "common use" clause in Owsichek v. State Guide
Licensing & Control Board' indicates that the clause itself is firmly
grounded in common law. 74 The Owsichek decision cites 75 as leading
cases in this area the United States Supreme Court's late nineteenth century
decisions in both Geer v. Connecticut76 and Illinois Central Railroad v.
Illinois.177 The Owsichek court stated that "[in light of this historical
fund investments.").
166. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.945(g) (1989) (requiring fifty percent of all mineral
lease rentals and royalties and fifty percent of net profit shares from oil and gas
leases to be deposited in the Permanent Fund).
167. 1991 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 66, § 10.
168. ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 2 ("The legislature shall provide for the
utilization, development, and conservation of all natural resources belonging to the
State, including land and waters, for the maximum benefit of its people.").
169. Id. § 3 ("Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife and waters
are reserved to the people for common use.").
170. 568 P.2d 996 (Alaska 1977).
171. Id. at 1003.
172. Metlakatla Indian Community, Annette Island Reserve v. Egan, 362 P.2d 901,
915 (Alaska 1961), vacate4 369 U.S. 45, aff4 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
173. 763 P2d 488 (Alaska 1988).
174. Id. at 494-96.
175. Id.
176. 161 U.S. 519 (1896), overruled by Hushes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325
(1979). In Geer, the Supreme Court had previously held that a state's control over
its wildlife is to be exercised "as a trust for the benefit of the people, and not as a
prerogative for the advantage of the government, as distinct from the people, or for
the benefit of private individuals as distinguished from the public good." Geer, 161
U.S. at 529. However, the Hughes Court noted that "[t]he Geer analysis has ... been
eroded to the point of virtual extinction in cases involving regulation of animals."
Hughes, 441 U.S. at 331.
177. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). In the context of a public trust in navigable waters, the
Court held that "[t]he State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the
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review we conclude that the common use clause was intended to engraft
in our constitution certain trust principles guaranteeing access to the fish,
wildlife and water resources of the state. ' 178
These objections to the settlement fail to recognize several fundamental
aspects of the dispute. The original trust lands which the state will be
returning to the MHTA were never truly state lands to be managed for the
benefit of the state's entire population. Instead, they were only to be
managed by the state as trustee for the mental health trust beneficiaries.
They are in state hands now only due to the state's derogation of its trustee
duties under the original grant from Congress. Similarly, the substituted
lands are transferred only to compensate the trust for the state's breach of
its fiduciary duty.
Since, according to the settling plaintiffs, much of the value of the
former trust lands still within the state's possession lies in mineral rights,
an attack based on section 6(i) of the Alaska Statehood Act could
jeopardize the settlement. Section 6(i) provides:
The grants of mineral lands to the State of Alaska under subsections (a)
and (b) of this section are made upon the express condition that all sales,
grants, deeds, or patents for any of the mineral lands so granted shall be
subject to and contain a reservation to the State of all of the minerals in the
lands so sold, granted, deeded, or patented.... 79
It also provides that a breach of this provision results in forfeiture of the
mineral lands to the United States, upon the initiation of appropriate
proceedings by the Attorney General in the United States District Court for
the District of Alaska.' s This provision presents a two-pronged problem.
First, if the MHTA is held to be a private party, the initial transfer of the
mineral rights from the DNR could result in forfeiture. Second, if the
MHTA is construed as a public body, any conveyance or lease from the
MHTA to a private party in the course of the MITA's profit-seeking land
management could result in forfeiture.
However, the clear text of the Alaska Statehood Act' 8' could defeat
an attack against the settlement under section 6(i). Section 6(i) explicitly
refers only to grants made to the State under sections 6(a) and 6(b) of the
Act. The grant under the AM-EA was incorporated into the Act under
whole people are interested ... than it can abdicate its police powers in the
administration of government and the preservation of the peace." ML at 453. The
Alaska Supreme Court referred to Illinois Central Railroad as "the lodestar of
American public trust law." Owsichek, 763 P2d at 496.
178. Owsichek, 763 P.2d at 496.
179. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 6(i), 72 Stat. 339, 342 (1958).
180. Id.
181. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
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section 6(k),"2 and thus, section 6(i) should not apply to the mental
health trust lands.
Such attacks could also be defended based upon the principles
announced hi State v. Lewis." This case held that only legislative
approval is necessary once Congress has consented to release the section
6(i) restrictions.'" Such congressional consent with respect to the
reconstitution of the mental health trust can be inferred by the AMHEA's
provision that the original land grant expressly included mineral rights.10
Since Congress firmly intended that the AMHEA establish a trust to
support Alaska's mental health program, Congress likely would approve
the return of land which would have remained in the trust if not for the
unauthorized actions of the trustee.
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution also supports
the settling parties' counterarguments. The Constitution indicates that the
AMHEA should supersede Alaska's statutory and constitutional
safeguards." The Alaska Supreme Court has stated that "we must,
when possible, construe statutory provisions in such a way as to avoid
unconstitutionality rather than simply void them on the basis of an
interpretation which renders them constitutionally infirm."''  However,
the Supremacy Clause argument is more effective with respect to the
original trust lands than to substitution lands, which have never been a part
of the congressionally created trust. In this respect, a settlement which
replaces former trust lands with cash - rather than other lands subject to
protection under Alaska law - may be preferable in that it would avoid the
more difficult constitutional questions.
2. Legislative Process Issues. In addition to the objection based on the
substantive land management provisions of chapter 66, the intervenors also
object to the process by which the legislature passed the bill. These
arguments have a basis in the Alaska Constitution.
182. See supa note 22 and accompanying text.
183. 559 P2d 630 (Alaska 1977), appeal dismissed, 432 U.S. 901 (1977).
184. Id. at 642.
185. Pub. L. No. 84-830, § 202(c), 70 Stat. 709, 711 (1956) ("All grants made or
confirmed under this section shall include mineral deposits .... ").
186. U.S. CONST. art. VI ('This Constitution, and the laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme law of the land;
and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or
laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.").
187. Hammond v. Hoffbeck, 627 P.2d 1052, 1059 (Alaska 1981) (citing 2A C.
Sands, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCION § 45.11 (4th ed. 1973); Boucher v.
Engstrom, 528 P.2d 456, 462 (Alaska 1974)).
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The intervenors assert a violation of article II, section 13 of the Alaska
Constitution.'8s The relevant portion of section 13 states that "[b]ills for
appropriations shall be confined to appropriations."' The intervenors
reason that chapter 66 makes an appropriation by conveying lands that may
be used for mental health purposes without any further action by the
legislature. Thus, it violates section 13 because it accomplishes other
purposes in addition to the appropriation. The state counters by arguing
that the term "appropriation" in this context should be construed to refer
to a setting aside of a certain amount of money, but not of land, for a
specified purpose."9
The intervenors also argue that chapter 66 violates article II, section 14,
which provides that "[n]o bill may become law unless it has passed three
readings in each house on three separate days."'' The purpose of this
language is to ensure that the legislature knows what it is passing."9 The
environmentalists argue that because the legislators did not have access to
the list of hypothecated lands at the time they passed the bill, they
technically did not "read" the bill.'13 The State counters that the
legislature knew what it was enacting and that the incorporation by
reference of the hypothecated lands list was perfectly consistent with the
constitutional requirements.
The environmentalists are particularly concerned with the hypothecated
land list because it includes over four million acres of the state's most
valuable land. They argue that hypothecating the lands as security was a
conveyance of land interests without reasonable safeguards of the public
interest as required by article VIII, section 10. The environmentalists
further allege that by incorporating the hypothecated lands list that neither
the legislature nor the public had seen, the legislature effectively delegated
its legislative powers to DNR and the plaintiffs." They feel that this
aspect of chapter 66 provides insufficient procedural safeguards for the
public and insufficient substantive standards for DNR and the
plaintiffs 95
188. Complaint of Intervenors, supra note 152, at 21.
189. ALASKA CoNsr. art. II, § 13.
190. The state relies on Thomas v. Rosen, 569 P2d 793 (Alaska 1977), which
interpreted "appropriation" as the term is used in article II, section 13 of the Alaska
Constitution, providing that the governor may, by veto, "strike or reduce items in
appropriation bills." ALASKA CONSr. art 11, § 13.
191. ALASKA CoNsr. art. II, § 14.
192. See North Slope Borough v. Sohio Petroleum Corp., 585 P2d 534 (Alaska
1978); State v. A.LI.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1980).
193. Complaint of Intervenors, supra note 152, at 2.
194. Id. at 2.
195. Id.
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Ironically, a majority of the Weiss plaintiffs, as well as the state,
believes that the participation of the environmental intervenors will
ultimately benefit the settlement process. 196 The superior court's eventual
ruling on a settlement proposal will likely be appealed to the Alaska
Supreme Court. If the supreme court were to approve a settlement based
on chapter 66 - over the objections raised by the intervenors -- it would
provide res judicata and collateral estoppel grounds on which the MHTA
could defend conveyances of trust lands in the future. Thus, that which
acts as a current impediment to a settlement process could eventually
provide long-term efficiencies that benefit the named parties involved.
VII. CONCLUSION: RECONCILING THE INTERESTS
One unequivocal fact looms over the Weiss litigation: there is a need
for timely settlement and final adjudication. The interests of both the
plaintiffs and the state would best be served by prompt resolution of the
dispute. The chapter 66-based settlement relieves the state from making
burdensome cash payments to compensate the trust for the unreturned land.
By not forcing the return of land conveyed to municipalities and native
corporations, this settlement also reconciles the public interest with the
plaintiffs' desire to have a reconstituted trust that resembles the original.
A threshold concern will be the validity of the environmentalists'
objections. Final adjudication on these issues seems distant; all parties are
likely to exhaust their rights of appeal. Even if these issues are eventually
resolved in favor of the state and the settling plaintiffs, notice to the class,
subsequent receipt of the class's comments, and an eventual fairness
hearing will further delay final adjudication.' 97 Once final adjudication
occurs, the process of reconstituting the trust with land will surely prove
lengthy and complex, although the settling plaintiffs' counsel is already
workting on developing this process. Under the express terms of chapter
66, the trust must be fully reconstituted by December 1, 1994 (which falls
within the last week of the Hickel Administration's tenure of office), or
else the plaintiffs may foreclose upon the hypothecated lands.
An alternative approach, advocated by the dissenting plaintiffs as well
as the environmental intervenors, involves a solution similar to chapter 210
196. Telephone Interview with James Gottstein, Attorney, Law Office of James
Gottstein, and David Walker, Attorney, Law Office of David Walker (Jan. 9,1992).
197. Philip Volland points out three potential problems with this process: (1) the
inherent incompetency of the class, (2) its statewide distribution requiring broad
public notice, and (3) the complexity of the settlement agreement. Mr. Volland
suggests that a special master be appointed to collect and summarize comments.
Interview with Philip R. Volland, Attorney, Rice, Volland, and Gleason (March 19,
1992).
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of the 1990 Alaska Session Laws.1 98 Such a plan would retain those
original mental health trust lands which are still in the trusL In addition,
it would call for the state to devote six percent of the general fund budget
annually to mental health programs. A final component would, as
proposed in chapter 66, create the MHTA to prioritize the funding of
programs, thereby removing responsibility from the legislature.'9
There are several obstacles to such a plan. First, the Hickel
Administration rejected such a plan last year due largely to the annual
burden that it would place on the general fund. The administration prefers
to compensate the trust with land. The Hickel Administration also opposes
the designation to the MI-TA of the legislature's and governor's discretion
over the prioritization of expenditures in the absence of a land-based
trustY° In addition, the majority of the plaintiffs are fearful of losing the
potential for a windfall that would result from discoveries of oil or mineral
reserves on trust lands?'
The superior court should expedite the schedule for the case on remand
to whatever extent possible, given the twin necessities of briefing fully the
complex issues involved and writing opinions as bases for subsequent
appeals. For a chapter 66-based settlement to work, time is of the essence
to prevent the foreclosure on hypothecated lands. While the current
settlement approach may not be the most ideal proposal in terms of ease
or cost of administration, it would both reconstitute the trust at the fair
market value of the original lands and provide a corpus that could be
preserved in virtual perpetuity. The settlement can work only if the courts
rule against the environmental intervenors' legal claims. If this occurs,
then the current settlement seems viable. If the intervenors prevail, or if
the parties determine that the reconstitution process cannot meet the
necessary timetable, then the alternative solution based on chapter 210
would be in order, especially given its relative ease of administration. The
courts and the parties must not lose sight that only a timely settlement and
final adjudication will allow mental health advocates and the state to focus
198. See supra text accompanying note 96. The similarity lies in the provision in
both Mr. Volland's proposal and in chapter 210 for six percent of the state's
unrestricted general fund revenues to be applied annually to mental health programs.
199. See supra text accompanying note 96; see also Hal Bernton, Mental-health-
trust Plaintiff Backs Alternate Plan, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, March 20, 1992.
200. Telephone interview with Wendy S. Feuer, Assistant Attorney General,
Natural Resources and Environmental Section, Anchorage (Nov. 6, 1992).
201. Interview with David T. Walker, Attorney, Law Office of David T. Walker(Mar. 16, 1992).
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more attention on the real underlying goal of the AMHEA: to provide
adequate programs for Alaska's mentally ill.
John Stuart Kaplan
MENTAL HEALTH LAND TRUST
Afterword
This section briefly describes the status of the Weiss litigation as this
issue of the Alaska Law Review goes to press. There are currently four
main categories of issues which must be resolved before the superior court
will submit the settlement agreement to the plaintiff class for approval.
The first group of issues are those raised by the environmental intervenors,
as detailed in the text of this Note. These issues are currently being
briefed, and oral arguments will likely take place in early January, 1993.
A second set of issues are raised by the dissenting plaintiffs' motion
in opposition to the proposed settlement The dissenting plaintiffs allege
deficiencies in the proposed settlement agreement and in the manner in
which it was negotiated. Evidentiary hearings regarding these claims were
held on September 24-25; the hearings did not conclude in the time
allocated and have been continued indefinitely. They will likely resume in
January when the court hears oral arguments on the environmental issues.
Also, Marathon Oil Company ("Marathof) and Union Oil Company
of California ("Unocal') filed a motion to intervene on September 4, 1992.
They oppose the provision in the settlement agreement which nominates
the state's oil and gas leases in Cook Inlet as substitute lands. As lessees
under these leases, Marathon and Unocal are wary of being affected by the
transfer of the lessor's interest. Such leases give the lessor various
discretionary rights, and the oil companies are worried that the MHTA, as
lessor, might attempt to limit production or hold out for higher royalty
rates. The court likely will not act on the oil companies' motion until the
environmental issues are resolved, since the opposed lease transfers will be
blocked if the environmentalists succeed in blocking the entire settlement
agreement.
Finally, a separate controversy was raised by the joint motion of the
state and the settling plaintiffs to modify the July 1, 1990 preliminary
injunction and to cancel lis pendens with respect to certain lands. This
motion seeks to let the state issue patents to third parties who have already
paid in full under land sale contracts. Because such third party rights are
a primary consideration for the state, the settling plaintiffs' willingness to
join in this motion is a key to the state's support of the settlement
agreement. If the court does not rule on this motion by the end of
November, either party can terminate the settlement agreement. The
environmental intervenors and the dissenting plaintiffs both oppose this
joint motion, claiming that granting the requested relief would only lead to
eventual further litigation.
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